curves are usually seen as sufficient grounds for regarding a pairwise ranking as ambiguous. Even if this stage produces a clear result, the more equal distribution will often have a lower mean, so the overall ranking is again ambiguous, unless one is prepared to specify the appropriate trade-off between equity and efficiency. For these reasons, there has grown up a general pessimism concerning the ability to rank most pairs of distributions and a belief that the issue is predominantly one of personal value judgments. 3 Making a distinction between the distributional and efficiency aspects of alternative allocation$, and viewing the ranking procedure as a two-stage process, may be a helpful analytical device. But the derived ordering is inconclusive for many pairs of distributions that can be ranked under the usual assumptions imposed on welfare functions. Section I examines an ordering that should have a wide degree of support and shows how the ordering can be implemented, by seeking a dominance relation between "generalized Lorenz curves". An application to comparisons between countries in Section II reveals that this ordering ranks successfully in 84 per cent of the cases. This suggests that the general pessimism concerning the ability to rank distributions is unwarranted, even when allowance is made for considerable variation in individual perceptions of inequality and in the emphasis placed on inequality relative to higher incomes.
These conclusions are qualified to some extent in Section III, where we examine weaker interpretations of efficiency preference that may be required if, for instance, the level of satisfaction experienced by individuals is influenced by the standard of living attained by other members of society. The weaker statements of efficiency preference make it progressively more difficult to achieve conclusive distributional rankings until, under the weakest interpretation considered, the corresponding partial ordering becomes more or less useless for practical purposes. A short summary of the paper and its principal conclusions is contained in Section IV.
I. PARTIAL ORDERINGS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS
We initially consider income distributions defined over a fixed population of n persons, identical in all respects except for their incomes. The possible social orderings are then represented by different choices of symmetric welfare functions W(.). The presumption that society favours a more equitable distribution, ceteris paribus, is captured in the usual way by requiring that mean-preserving regressive transfers do not increase welfare. This interpretation of equity preference is equivalent to the assumption that W(.) is Schurconcave (see Dasgupta et al., 1973) (2) (S-concavity) W(By) 2 W(y) for all bistochastic matrices B.
Note that S-concavity implies that For the concept of "efficiency preference" we wish to capture the desire for higher incomes over lower incomes, and an obvious method of doing so is to require that W(.) is a non-decreasing function of all incomes: The introduction of a statement of efficiency preference enables us to compare distributions with different means. We will let W1 denote the set of non-decreasing S-concave welfare functions and write y>lY' if y is never inferior to y'. A sufficient condition for this to hold is that y has both a higher mean and higher Lorenz curve than y'. For by proportionately raising all incomes in y' until ,u' = ,, the level of welfare increases; but the Lorenz curve remains unchanged, so by Lemma 1 the resulting distribution is still not superior to y. Thus Theorem 2 indicates that an unambiguous ranking for all W(.) E I' is obtainable if and only if the generalized Lorenz curves do not intersect. Clearly this latter condition will apply if one of the distributions has both a higher 8 mean and higher Lorenz curve. But it will also be satisfied in other cases if the higher mean is sufficient to offset the lower part of the Lorenz curve. This is likely to be true in many important practical situations, since differences between Lorenz curves tend to be relatively small compared with variations in mean incomes. For instance, a large sample of countries is unlikely to generate Lorenz curves whose ordinates differ by more than a factor of 2 or 3 (except at the very bottom of the distribution), while mean incomes may well vary by a factor of 10 or 20. Thus, scaling up the Lorenz curves to form the generalized Lorenz curves will often reveal a dominance relationship that is not apparent from an examination of means and Lorenz curves on their own.
The next section illustrates how generalized Lorenz curves may be applied empirically. However, before this is done it is necessary to extend the analysis to populations of varying sizes. For our purposes it is sufficient to imagine 
II. AN APPLICATION TO INTER-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
To illustrate the problems that frequently arise when comparing distributions and the way that generalized Lorenz curves can help to resolve these problems, we consider an application to distributional data for 20 countries. Figures for cumulated income shares, derived from Jain (1975) , are presented in Table 1 . These refer to national samples of income recipients and, where a choice is possible, have been selected for the year closest to 1970. Inevitably, the data are likely to be plagued with the usual problems concerning the treatment of casual workers, income recipients below tax or sample thresholds, income from home production and the many other factors that affect comparability across countries. For this reason the precise figures and the ranking obtained should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the inter-country data provide the basis for an interesting application of the results of the previous section.
Inspection of Table 1 If we set aside for the moment the questions of data reliability and comparability and imagine that we are attempting to assess the desirability of being a random citizen in these countries, the weakness of this ranking becomes apparent. Sweden has over ten times the average income of India, Indonesia, Kenya and Tanzania, but is not ranked above any of these countries because of the lower income share received by the bottom decile of the Swedish population. Yet simple computations reveal that the average income of the bottom 10 per cent, of Swedish income recipients would still place them in the top 5 per cent, and perhaps even the top 1 per cent, of any of these other countries. In these circumstances it is difficult to conceive how the Swedish income distribution could be regarded as inferior to those of India, Indonesia, Kenya or Tanzania The resulting ordering over the 20 countries is illustrated in Figure 3 . Not surprisingly, the ranking corresponds closely to that based on GDP per capita,12 and it is only those countries with broadly similar average income levels that provide examples of inconclusive rankings. In all other cases the differences in mean incomes is more than sufficient to offset any variations in the relative shares of the lower income groups in each of the countries.13
III. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF EFFICIENCY PREFERENCE
While the welfare standard has been assumed to reflect a desire for both greater equality and higher incomes, ceteris paribus, it is not obvious what should be contained in the ceteris paribus clause. In the case of equity preference, the S-concavity condition concerns a reduction in inequality keeping the mean income constant. This suggests that the statement of efficiency preference should be related to an increase in incomes while maintaining the same degree of inequality. the natural interpretation given in (5), since there is no reason to expect that increments to one or more incomes will leave the inequality level unaltered. On the contrary, a large increase in the income of the richest person would be universally regarded as representing an increase in inequality. For this reason the statement of efficiency preference given in (5) may come into conflict with the social desire for more equal distributions. In the case of utilitarian welfare functions, the potential conflict between efficiency gains resulting from income increments and the possible equity losses is always resolved on the side of the efficiency gain. So the monotonicity condition (5) is always satisfied. The same will be true of any welfare function that is "individualistic" (depending only on individual welfare levels), if individual welfare levels are independent of other people's incomes. But it may not apply if we wish to incorporate elements other than individual welfare levels into the welfare function, or if we recognize that a person's sense of wellbeing is not independent of the standards of his friends and neighbours.14 If income differences are a source of envy, or are socially divisive for some other reason, we cannot presume that an increase in the income of one individual will not have repercussions on the welfare levels of others that lead to an overall reduction in welfare. In these circumstances it seems questionable whether it should be treated as axiomatic that an increment to any persons income necessarily improves the standard of welfare, as is done in condition (5).
Two issues are relevant at this point. The first concerns whether the social evaluation of distributions should reflect the opinions of individuals if these are influenced by envy, malice, myopia or similar considerations. In these circumstances there are grounds for arguing that social decisions should override the feelings of individual members-that they should be based on how people ought to respond to situations, rather than how they actually react. Without discussing this issue in any depth (see, for example, Sen, 1973, p. 51), it is clear that the monotonicity conditions (5) might be justified by appealing to such arguments. The results of Theorem 2 would then continue to be the appropriate procedure for implementing the ordering of distributions.
However, if we reject this line of reasoning, and with it the monotonicity condition, a second issue arises: what alternative concept of efficiency preference is satisfactory, and how does this affect the distributional ranking?15 One possibility is the requirement that welfare improves if all incomes are increased in the same proportion. Theorem 3 provides the welfare rationalization of the standard procedure of ranking one distribution above another if and only if it has a higher mean and a higher Lorenz curve. It also indicates the implications of replacing the "monotonicity" interpretation of efficiency preference with the weaker one of "scale improvement". As we have seen in the previous section, the welfare dominance relation >2 is considerably weaker than >1, and it will be likely that many, if not most, pairwise comparisons of distributions will be inconclusive. But even the "scale improvement" interpretation of efficiency preference may be too strong to be universally acceptable. For while scaling up the distribution leaves relative incomes unchanged, absolute differences between incomes are widened. Those for whom these absolute differences are important (for example, subscribers to Kolm's (1976a, b) "leftist" inequality measure) may well reject (11) on the grounds that the increase in efficiency may not offset the rise in inequality.
Another variant of efficiency preference that is sufficiently weak to cause no offence involves fixed additions to each person's income:
where e is the unit vector (1, 1, . . ., 1) . Here the rise in mean income maintains the same absolute differences between incomes and reduces relative differences. There would not therefore seem to be any increase in inequality to offset the efficiency gain from higher incomes, so the efficiency and equity preferences of society do not come into conflict. Unfortunately, a universally acceptable concept of efficiency preference is achieved only by a further weakening of the corresponding partial ordering over distributions. Letting W3={W(.)IW(.) satisfies (2) and (13) is weaker than the ordering induced by WV2. To assess just how much weaker the ranking will be, it is again necessary to obtain equivalent conditions that could be implemented empirically. the United Kingdom is still ranked above the Netherlands, and New Zealand above Finland. Both of these cases involve countries with very similar mean incomes. That the ordering 3 manages to achieve conclusive results in only 2 of the 190 potential pairwise comparisons between countries makes it almost useless for practical purposes: if we are only prepared to impose restrictions (2) and (13) on the welfare function, we can expect little guidance on the relative desirability of different distributions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the problem of ranking income distributions using a social welfare function W(.). In particular, we have investigated whether it is possible to impose restrictions on W(.) that are both sufficiently weak to command a wide degree of support, and sufficiently strong to produce a conclusive ranking in many practical situations. The assumption that W(.) is equity-preferring (in the sense of being Schur-concave) and a non-decreasing function of all incomes (one interpretation of "efficiency preference") seems to achieve this dual objective. Furthermore, the corresponding ranking can be easily implemented by seeking a dominance relation between "generalized Lorenz curves", obtained by scaling up the ordinary Lorenz curve by the mean of the distribution. When applied to a comparison between income distributions in 20 countries, this ordering produced conclusive results in 84 per cent of the pairwise comparisons.
It can, however, be argued that the assumption that W(.) is increasing in all incomes is unacceptable, since it may be in conflict with the desire for greater equality. Replacing this with the weaker assumption that society values a proportional improvement in all incomes generates an ordering equivalent to the common practice of ranking distributions only when one has both a higher mean and higher Lorenz curve. But this may also be criticized on the grounds that a proportional improvement in all incomes increases absolute income differences. Substituting the even weaker assumption, that a constant absolute increase in everyone's income raises welfare, results in a ranking that is probably uncontroversial, but at the same time is too weak to be empirically useful.
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